

# Let's Not Forget Validation

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**Abstract**—As we are moving from a traditional software development process to a new development paradigm where the process is largely driven by tools and automation, new challenges for verification and validation (V&V) emerge. Productivity improvements in this new paradigm will be achieved through reduced emphasis on testing of implementations, increased reliance on automated analysis tools applied in the specification domain, verifiably correct generation of source-code, and verifiably correct compilation. The V&V effort will now be largely focused on assuring that the *formal specifications* are correct and that the *tools* are trustworthy so that we can rely on the results of the analysis and code generation without extensive additional testing of the resulting implementation. Traditionally, most research efforts have been devoted to the verification problem. In this position paper we point out the importance of *validation* and argue that if we fail to adequately address the validation problem, the impact of verifying code generation and compilation will be limited.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade and a half, our group's focus has been on the development of software for safety-critical systems; the focus of this paper.

In software engineering we make a distinction between the *validation* and the *verification* of a software system under development. Verification is concerned with demonstrating that the software implements the functional and non-functional requirements. Verification answers the question “*is this implementation correct with respect to its requirements?*” Validation, on the other hand, is concerned with determining if the functional and non-functional requirements are the right requirements. Validation answers the question “*will this system, if build correctly, be safe and effective for its intended use?*” There is ample evidence that most safety problems can be traced to erroneous and inadequate requirements. Incomplete, inaccurate, ambiguous, and volatile requirements have plagued the software industry since its inception. In a seminal 1987 article [5], Fred Brooks wrote

*The hardest single part of building a software system is deciding precisely what to build. No other part of the conceptual work is as difficult as establishing the detailed technical requirements... No other part of the work so cripples the resulting system if done wrong. No other part is as difficult to rectify later.*

We know that the majority of software errors are made during requirements analysis [4], [10], [30], [26], and that requirements errors are more likely to affect the safety of a




Fig. 1. Traditional Software Development Process.

system than errors introduced during design or implementation [21], [23].

Therefore, to improve the safety and overall quality of software intensive critical systems it is imperative that the requirements are properly *validated*. Unfortunately, current certification standards, for example, DO-178B [28], as well as the research efforts outlined in the Verifiable Software Project focus almost exclusively on various *verification* activities. We find this unfortunate since one of the most critical problems with current certification standards and development practices is a lack of robust and reliable ways of assessing whether the requirements are correct. To gain the full advantage of verifying code generators and compilers we have to develop new techniques to determine if the requirements have been adequately validated.

There is a significant effort in the avionics and medical technology industry to reduce the high cost of software development. The current trend is to focus on tools and automation, for example, automatically generating certifiably correct production code from a formal requirements specification or generating MC/DC tests for certification. This approach is commonly referred to as model-based development. Since this approach relies heavily on the correctness of the model (or specification) for the correctness of the derived system, our current inability to adequately validate our requirements raises a serious concern regarding the adoption of this type of automation. In the remainder of this position paper we will discuss model-based development in more detail and point to some concerns that must be considered as we adopt verifying translators in the software development for safety-critical systems.




Fig. 2. Model-Based Development.

## II. MODEL-BASED DEVELOPMENT

Traditionally, software development has been largely a manual endeavor. Validation that we are building the right system has been achieved through requirements and specification inspections and reviews. Verification that the system is developed to satisfy its specification is archived through inspections of design artifacts and extensive testing of the implementations (Figure 1). In critical embedded control systems, such as the software controlling aeronautics applications and medical devices, the validation and verification phase (V&V) is particularly costly and consume approximately 50%–70% of the software development resources. Thus, if we could devise techniques to help us reduce the cost of V&V, dramatic cost savings could be achieved. The current trend towards *model-based development* is one attempt to address this problem.

In model-based development, the development effort is centered around a formal description of the proposed software system. For validation and verification purposes, this *formal specification* can then be subjected to various types of analysis, for example, completeness and consistency analysis [15], [17] model checking [13], [7], [8], [18], [9], theorem proving [1], [2], and test case generation [6], [12], [11], [3], [25], [19], [27]. Through manual inspections, formal verification, and simulation and testing we convince ourselves (and any regulatory agencies) that the software specification possesses desired properties. The implementation is then *automatically and correctly generated* from this specification and little or no additional testing of the implementation is required (Figure 2). There are currently several commercial and research tools that attempt to provide these capabilities—commercial tools are, for example, Esterel and SCADE from Esterel Technologies, Statemate from i-Logix [14], and SpecTRM from Safeware Engineering [22]; and examples of research tool are SCR [16], RSML<sup>-e</sup> [29], and Ptolemy [20].

The capabilities of model-based development enable us to follow a different process. The development is centered around the formal specification and the V&V has been largely moved from testing and analyzing the code (Fig-




Fig. 3. Model-Based Development Process.

ure 1) to analyzing and testing the specification (Figure 3)—the traditional (and, in the critical systems domain, very costly) unit testing of code is replaced with testing and analysis of the specification in the hope to provide higher quality at a lower cost.

Note here that, in our opinion, the possibility of reducing or fully automating the costly unit-testing efforts are key to success of model-based development. We have found very little support for this type of development if modelling and analysis are to be performed in *addition* to what is currently done—these new techniques must either make current efforts more efficient or replace some currently required V&V activity. In either case, our increased reliance on tools requires that they can be trusted—a prime opportunity for verifying translators as well as analysis tools that provide proof justifications and proof explanations. On the other hand, we are now demanding that the formal specification serving as the basis for our development is correct with respect to the customers’ true needs; a demand that can only be met through extensive model validation.

In an ongoing project with Rockwell Collins Inc. and NASA Langley Research Center we have investigated model-based development focusing mainly on the verification aspects of the problem. Below we provide a short overview of one of our case examples and discuss some issues that have arisen during the course of this project.

### A. Overview of a Flight Guidance System

A Flight Guidance System (FGS) is a component of the overall Flight Control System (FCS) in a modern commercial aircraft. It compares the measured state of an aircraft (position, speed, and attitude) to the desired state and generates pitch and roll guidance commands to minimize the difference between the measured and desired state. These guidance commands are both displayed to the pilot as guidance cues on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and sent to the Autopilot (AP) that moves the control surfaces of the aircraft to achieve commanded pitch and roll.

The internal structure of the FGS can be broken down into the mode logic and the flight control laws. The flight control laws accept information about the aircraft’s current and desired state and compute the pitch and roll guidance

commands. The mode logic determines which lateral and vertical modes are armed (attempting to lock on to a navigation source) and active (providing guidance to the aircraft) at any given time. It is an excellent example because it is complex and representative of a class of problems frequently encountered in the design of embedded control systems.

### B. Modelling Process

In the project, Rockwell Collins researchers collected the system requirements as informal “shall” statements. These requirements were relatively mature and well-understood. The next phase, modelling, consisted of constructing by hand an executable model that we believed exhibited the behavior informally stated in the shall statements; in this case we used the RSML<sup>-e</sup> notation developed at the University of Minnesota. Throughout creation of the model, we continually used the simulation capabilities of the RSML<sup>-e</sup> execution and analysis environment NIMBUS to execute the model and informally confirm that it behaved as we expected. As we built the model, we discovered and corrected numerous ambiguous, unclear, and inconsistent informal requirements.

In the formal verification phase, we manually translated the informal shall requirements into formal CTL properties stated over the model. We translated The RSML<sup>-e</sup> model into NuSMV using a translator developed by the University of Minnesota. Again, the formalization process from shall statements to CTL helped us improve the informal requirements. We used the NuSMV model checker to determine whether the properties held over the model or not.

When completed, the model of the FGS mode logic consisted of 41 input variables (Boolean and enumerated), 16 small, tightly synchronized hierarchical finite state machines, 122 macro or function definitions, 29 output variables (Boolean and enumerated), and was roughly 160 pages long in its typeset version. We developed 300+ CTL properties based on the informal requirements. A detailed description of the model and its simulation environment is available in [24].

### III. THE SPECIFICATION WILL BE WRONG

As mentioned above, the process of creating a model from the English prose requirements caused us to go back and clarify the English statement of the requirements. In the same way, translating the English statements into CTL also prompted us to go back and clarify the English statement. In addition, the verification that the model satisfied the requirements (formalized as CTL properties) led to additional insight into the validation problem. For example, consider the well-validated and (at the time) non-controversial requirement below.

*If Heading Select mode is not selected, Heading Select mode shall be selected when the HDG switch is pressed on the Flight Control Panel.*

After formalization into CTL, this property did not verify in our model. Using the model-checker we discovered two ways in which this property will not be true. First, if another event arrived at the same time as the HDG switch was pressed, that event could preempt the HDG switch event. Second, if this side of the FGS was not active, the HDG switch event was completely ignored by this side of the FGS. These were two scenarios that were correctly handled in the *model* of the FGS systems, but not captured in any *Requirement* (property). The counterexamples from NuSMV led us to modify the requirement to state

*If this side is active and Heading Select mode is not selected, Heading Select mode shall be selected when the HDG switch is pressed on the FCP (providing no higher priority event occurs at the same time).*

While longer and more difficult to read than the original statement, it is a more accurate description of the system’s intended behavior. Of course, we also had to clearly define what a “higher priority” event was.

We found that the process of proving the properties forced us to go back and modify virtually all of our original English requirements; consequently, all formal specification properties also had to be modified. It also became clear to the engineers formalizing the properties that great care needs to be taken when formulating SMV properties to ensure that their proofs are meaningful. For example, in the modelling of the FGS we frequently used macros (Boolean functions) to encapsulate commonly used properties, for example, we might encapsulate a complex condition in a macro named “When\_Lateral\_Mode\_Manually\_Selected”. The macros were frequently used when the requirements were stated as SMV properties. In most cases, the macro was used as the antecedent of an implication, for example,

```
AG(m_When_Lateral_Mode_Manually_Selected.result ->
    Onside_FD_On)
```

Naturally, if the macro “When\_Lateral\_Mode\_Manually\_Selected” was over-constrained in the model (or even contradictory and thus always false) this proof would succeed but it would be rather meaningless.

To summarize, when developing formal models of any substantial system, the models will most likely be incorrect with respect to the customers’ real needs. In our case, the three complementary models—informal English language requirements, requirements formalized as CTL properties, and an executable formal model—served to check each other in a rigorous validation process. Had we only built the executable model and validated it through testing, it is highly likely that significant flaws would have remained. Similarly, had we been blessed with a correct-by-construction tool that would have helped us synthesize an implementation from our 300+ CTL properties, the implementation would certainly have been grossly incorrect with respect to the customers’ real needs. It is clear that a *rigorous validation process* must be in place to

ensure that any formal artifacts serving as the basis for downstream automation are correct; without this validation any breakthroughs in verifiably correct code generation and compilation will achieve limited success.

#### IV. LOSS OF “COLLATERAL VALIDATION”

Recall that the goal of adopting model-based development is to reduce the high cost of software development without sacrificing quality. These cost savings will be achieved by replacing costly manual processes with tools. As mentioned above, our current inability to adequately validate our requirements, models, and properties raises a serious concern regarding the adoption of this type of automation. Manual processes, may that be design, coding, testing, or putting a medical device through clinical studies, draw on the collective experience and vigilance of many dedicated software and engineering professionals; professionals that provide “*collateral validation*” as they are working on the software. Experienced professionals designing, developing code, or defining test-cases provide additional validation of the software system; if there is a problem with the specified functionality of the system, they have a chance of noticing and taking corrective action. As an example, consider the requirements example from the previous section. Although the facts that the FGS had to be active and that no higher-priority events were received at the same time were not explicitly stated in any of the original requirements. Nevertheless, in production the engineers implemented the FGS functionality correctly; these problems were caught in the manual development process and corrected. When replacing these manual efforts with automation, proper validation of the formal requirements specifications on which the automation is based becomes absolutely essential; there may be no safeguards in the downstream development activities to catch critical flaws in the formal model—the possibility for informal *collateral validation* is lost. This again brings us back to the critical need for robust techniques for validation of the formal artifacts forming the basis for the model-based development.

#### V. SUMMARY

The emergence of formal modelling languages acceptable to practicing engineers and the development of powerful analysis tools, for example, model checkers, will enable a new development paradigm relying heavily on the use of automated tools for analysis and code generation—a development paradigm often referred to as model-based development. As a community, we are now in a position to bring the full power of formal software development to fruition. As discussed in this position paper, however, we have to approach this opportunity cautiously. All formal development efforts rely on a correct specification as a basis for development and verification; this puts enormous demands on the *validation* of the specification—the specification simply must be correct with respect to the customers’

needs. Unfortunately, research efforts outlined in the Verifiable Software Project focus almost exclusively on various *verification* activities. We find this troublesome; to gain the full advantage of verifying code generators and compilers we have to concurrently develop techniques to determine if the specifications have been adequately validated. It would be highly disappointing if the enormous advances in verification technology we have seen the last decade—and will most likely see in the future—are used to verify that faulty specifications are implemented correctly. A few well publicized failures are enough to make widespread industry adoption and regulatory acceptance exceedingly difficult and set our efforts back a decade—let us make sure that this does not happen.

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